Perception and Deception

Sunzi wrote The Art of War in thirteen chapters. In the first chapter he explores five factors that determine the outcomes of wars: political condition, climate, terrain, leadership, and method and discipline. To calculate the chance of victory before going to war, a commander needs to think about and assess the following conditions: whether the people are in complete accord with their rulers; the season and the weather; the distance the army would travel and the ground and road conditions; the performance of military chiefs and how effectively they organize and manage their armies.

There is a famous quote in the book: “If you know your enemies and know yourself, you can win numerous battles without risk.” Sunzi put forward that it is important to evaluate the situation on both sides, and analyze it in detail, because full preparation is critical to quickly assume the advantage. Whether one is able to win a war is determined by both circumstances and preparedness.

A general who knows the strength of his own army but not the weaknesses of the enemy has only a 50 percent chance of victory. A general who knows the strength of the enemy but not the weakness of his own army also stands a 50/50 chance. A general who knows the strength of both the enemy forces and his own, but is unaware of the difficulties of the terrain still does not improve his odds. Sunzi argued that with a thorough knowledge of the enemy and oneself, victory can be assured: “With a thorough knowledge of earth and heaven, victory will be complete.”

One key method of knowing one’s enemy was, of course, the employment of spies. Only through accurate intelligence can one be confident of having control over the battlefield. Spies have been important to waging war throughout history, and sometimes they are the decisive factor in the outcome. The relationships between different countries are complicated, so it has always been important to cultivate espionages who helped the military understand the real situation of enemies. Appropriate strategies could then be adopted.

Sunzi argued that a commander should employ various tactics according to the size of his army, closely monitor the evolving situation in the enemy camp, and modify his plans accordingly. A good commander must be level-headed, decisive and quick to respond, addressing the disadvantages his army was working with and using what he had discovered about the flaws of his rivals.

Sunzi also elaborated on how to build up armed forces. A nation’s military forces are developed over many years before they actually take up combat. So planning must be always anchored in the perspective of being at war before a conflict really takes place. By doing so the nation creates an invincible momentum, which in time of wars will be released with the crushing might and velocity of a waterfall dashing down cliffs.

Sunzi also proposed the strategy of the ambush. Being unpredictable allows for variable assaults that take the enemy by surprise. One can be highly sure of success if one only attacks undefended places, and one can ensure the safety of one’s defense if one holds positions that can’t be attacked. Therefore a general is skilled in attack if his enemy doesn’t know what to defend, and in defense if his enemy does not know what to attack.

The soul of Sunzi’s art relies on varying the dispersion and concentration of forces. The troops should be able to move swiftly as a strong wind, remain unruffled like a forest when necessary, be as destructive as fire in offense, hold fast like a mountain in defense. They may remain as impenetrable as an overcast sky or strike suddenly like a thunderbolt.

Sunzi openly declared that all warfare is based on deception. For example, when the army is ready for attack, it should pretend that it isn’t; when the army is approaching, it should make the enemy believe it is still far away; when the army is in fact far away, it should make the enemy believe it is near. In a word, the army needs to attack its enemy when they are unprepared, and appear when they haven’t anticipated it. That is the soul and secret of victory. War is, and always was, based on deception and motivated by gain.

WEN HAIMING is an associate professor at the School of Philosophy of Renmin University of China. He has a doctorate from the University of Hawaii and specializes in Chinese and Comparative Philosophy.