Sino-U.S. Leadership Meeting Sets New Directions for Bilateral Relations

On January 20, 2011 Chinese and American presidents meet the media in the White House.

    Chinese president Hu Jintao's state visit to the United States of America (January 19 to 21, 2011) drew the attention of the world. There are two yardsticks for evaluating President Hu's visit and the outcomes of the meeting between the two leaders. One is whether the two sides will rethink and reconcile the conflicts and causes of tension present since 2010; two is a measure of whether the two sides can find more rational and cooperative modes for coping with the disputes in the bilateral relationship. By these standards, we can say that President Hu's visit to the United States was indeed successful.

Standing on the Historic Intersection Points

    President Hu's state visit to the United States is a historic event in the history of Sino-U.S. relations. After the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979, bilateral relations underwent two major adjustments. At present, the two countries are entering a third period of major realignment. The focus of this leadership meeting is how to take this opportunity to upgrade and renew the policy framework of Sino-U.S. relations to guide development along mutually satisfactory lines.

    The first major adjustment – the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1979 – was a decisive event in the history of Sino- U.S. relations. The top leaders of the two countries grasped the strategic opportunity provided by the disintegration of cold war conditions, and transcended differences in ideologies and political systems to form the ''Big Triangle,'' an anti-USSR alignment achieved through diplomatic channels. This development brought about progress in Sino-U.S. bilateral relations and regional stability.

    The second occurred in 1989-1991, in the aftermath of the great changes in international strategies following the June 4 Incident, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, and the fragmentation of Eastern Europe. When the United States lost its nemesis the Soviet Union, it became the lone superpower and ushered in a mono-polar age. Guided by the principle of ''keeping a low profile, focusing on current tasks'' set by Deng Xiaoping, chief architect of China's reform, China stood firm, stuck to the policy of reform and opening-up, and practiced the strategy of ''reaching out'' to develop a market economy and foster international cooperation based on equality and mutual benefit. After some policy see-sawing in its first term the Clinton administration proclaimed in 1996 a ''policy of engagement.'' China and the United States did not deny they had disputes, but tried to seek practical development in the bilateral relations based on mutual benefit and cooperation.

    In 2009, China and the U.S. embarked on the third major adjustment in the history of their relationship. Changes have occurred in the strategic posture of the two countries, as China has maintained fast and consistent economic growth and the American economy has been on a downturn since the global financial crisis. As a result, China’s power and influence on world affairs is approaching center stage, while the United States is backing towards the wings. A new depression era has not been declared in the United States, but it is undergoing the most difficult phase in its domestic economy, internal affairs and diplomatic relations

    Briefly, the Obama administration's abandonment of the preemptive strategies of the Bush administration was cause for optimism; unfortunately the other hand on the wheel seems determined to continue consolidation of its characteristic global hegemony. Problems, troubles and disputes erupted now and then in 2010, with impacts on bilateral relations, most notably American arms sales to Taiwan. This is part and parcel of the United States' ''China anxiety,'' which boils down to Washington being worried that China will take America’s relative ''weakness'' as an opportunity to stage a strategic expansion in Asia. ''China anxiety'' became U.S. embarrassment when Wikileaks exposed that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once consulted former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd about how to take a harder line toward China.

    The Obama administration's ''China anxiety'' has reached unprecedented heights, and it is mulling over what constitutes an effective ''China policy'' – one that would block any moves to ''show contempt for Number One,'' reduce the United States' sphere of influence or squeeze out her strategic presence in East Asia. Part of that ''China policy'' is inward-looking: it is restructuring its domestic economy and getting set to restore its status as a leading exporter.

    Another reason is China's ''U.S. dysphoria.'' Many Chinese people resent the United States' butting into East Asian affairs yet again. The United States has absorbed massive amounts of Chinese funds through the sale of its government bonds, but still hogs its seat at the top of the heap. Theories of a ''US conspiracy'' are circulating among certain people, focused on the currency war, the Taiwan issue, the disputes in the South China Sea, the U.S.-ROK joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea, the DPRK tensions, and the U.S.-Japan military alliance. But the lightning rod is the fact that China has contributed a lot to the global and American economy, but the United States is still making trouble in China's backyard.