Double-track Negotiation the Way to Success

By ZOU JI

INTERNATIONAL developments in response to climate change have gone beyond the climate change issue to become a comprehensive, strategic subject interlinked with international and domestic politics, economics, trade, energy, technology and the environment.

Different drivers are pushing forward international efforts for coordinated response, since the modern world economy consists of a mix of economic entities, including developed and developing countries, and the latter comprises the emerging industrialized ones and the least developed ones.

For developed economic entities in places like Europe and North America, the motives are to solve a series of troublesome practical questions while maintaining their advantageous strategic position in the world. This is the basic double impetus that shapes how they define their policies on climate and energy resources.

Emerging economies found in places such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico are wrestling with a situation where their demand for energy and resources is subject to complex conditions: on the one hand, per capita energy consumption and emission levels are low, but total energy consumption and emission levels are high and growing fast; on the other, they are restricted by what resources and environmental capacities, financing, expertise, technology, and social management capability they have on hand.

In medium-sized and smaller developing countries, and the least developed countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, per capita and total energy consumption and emissions are both small. These nations are the most vulnerable to the extreme climate events brought about by climate change, and the most poorly equipped to recover. Their appeals for international action on climate change, poverty elimination, and international financial and technological support make the strongest case.

The “Fundamental Law” for International Response

Current international efforts to jointly and systematically manage responses to climate change are mainly based on the multilateral political and legal systems of the United Nations, and their direct legal foundations are the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol. According to the Convention, the supreme policy-making body is the annual Conference of the Parties (COP), and its resolutions have the effect of international laws. The formation of resolutions follows the principle of “agreement through negotiations of various parties.”

In 1989, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published its first assessment report, saying that observations showed that the global climate was indeed changing, and the change was the result of human activity. It warned that the negative impact of climate change on sustainable economic development should not be underestimated, and the international community should take action to cope with it. In response, the 1990 UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to conduct negotiations and achieve an international convention on global climate change. Through multilateral intergovernmental negotiations lasting more than two years, in 1992 the final version of the convention was made available for signature at the Rio de Janeiro UN Conference on Environment and Development. In 1994 this convention took effect, and in 1995 the first COP was convened in Berlin. It has been convened annually since then, with the UNFCCC acting as the “fundamental law” governing international climate response process. The basic principle is “common but differentiated responsibilities” in global climate protection.

In 1997, at the third COP in Kyoto, the Kyoto Protocol was signed to promote implementation of the convention. For the first time ever, the Kyoto Protocol established legally binding annual emission reduction targets for developed signatory nations in the First Commitment Period (2008-2012). According to the targets in the First Commitment Period, developed nations as a whole were expected to reduce their emission of six greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide and methane, by 5.2 percent from the 1990 level. Specifically, the European Union would cut down 8 percent, the United States 7 percent, and Japan 6 percent.

The Kyoto Protocol also established the Clean Development Mechanism for cooperation between developed and developing nations in emission reduction, allowing the governments or corporate investors of developed countries to invest in projects in developing countries for that purpose; the amount of reduced emissions are credited to developed countries.

The Kyoto Protocol has also established an emissions trading mechanism between developed countries, a joint implementation mechanism between the developed countries and the former USSR and Eastern European countries, and other mechanisms for carbon markets. The Kyoto Protocol is an important milestone in implementing various principles of the UNFCCC. But as far as its implementing rules go, numerous problems remain. To address these, the 1998 COP put forward the Buenos Aires Action Plan, demanding that negotiations on the implementing regulations for the Kyoto Protocol should be concluded at the sixth COP in the Hague. Negotiations became more difficult as more details were fleshed out, and these differences were hard to mediate. The 2000 Hague negotiations failed, and the United States proclaimed it would not sign the Kyoto Protocol. In 2001, through efforts and compromises made by various parties, at the seventh COP the Marrakech Agreement was reached, forming the basis of the implementing rules of the Kyoto Protocol, pushing the Protocol course a step forward. In 2005, the Protocol officially took effect. Following that, the European Union established the world’s first greenhouse gas emission trading system, forming a regional, transnational carbon market. The Multilateral Clean Development Mechanism has been implemented.

Origins of the Double Track

In 2005 the Montreal COP adopted a resolution to set up the AWG-KP (Ad Hoc Working Group for Kyoto Protocol), for the purpose of initiating in 2006 negotiations on new emission reduction targets for developed nations in the Second Commitment Period (2012-2020).

In 2007, the 13th COP was convened in Bali, Indonesia, to create the Bali Roadmap. It was decided to operate a widespread negotiation process. While conducting AWG-KP negotiations (the first track) an Ad Hoc Working Group for Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) (the second track) got the go-ahead to conduct talks on long-term cooperative action. It was also agreed that the talks should end at the 15th COP in 2009. This is the double-track of the Bali Roadmap.

The Bali Roadmap, through its dual negotiation streams, defined the main contents of the AWG-LCA talks, including long-term cooperation prospects, emission reduction targets for non-signatory developed nations (mainly the United States), and the comparability of emission reduction quotas. Developing countries, with aid from developed countries for capability building and technical transfers, are charged with taking nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA). The Roadmap also defines the measurement, reporting and evaluation of such aid, the NAMA of developing countries, technological development and transfer, financial assistance, and adaptation to climate change.

The Leading Factor

At the 2009 Copenhagen Conference, certain progress was made in negotiations, and the Copenhagen Accord was reached. Although it is not legally binding, the political foundation was laid for further talks. Huge gaps exist between various developed countries and between developed and developing countries on important issues such as emission reduction targets for developed countries, financial aid to developing countries, and technology transfer. The tasks set out in the Bali Roadmap were not completed. The signatory parties decided to continue negotiations, with the goal to complete them at the Cancun Conference in 2010. But seen from today’s perspective, they were too optimistic about completing the tasks on time. Fortunately, talks are still proceeding on the dual tracks established by the Bali Roadmap, guided by the UNFCCC principles and United Nations mechanisms. This guarantees that the talks will not deviate from the direction set by the UNFCCC.

Since the Copenhagen Conference in 2009, developed countries (especially the United States) have complained about the inefficacy of the UN mechanisms, and stressed the roles of the G20 Forum and the Major Economies Forum (MEF). Their agenda is obvious: policy-making through the MEF is preferable.

One question is worth asking: in any of the platforms, which country or countries have the clout to be heard and wield influence? Undeniably, the United States is the most influential developed country; its domestic politics will have a remarkable impact on the overall international response to climate change. The influence of developing countries such as China and India, whose populations and total emissions are large, is increasing day by day. In short, any international response to our collective climate dilemma faces dynamic developments and a far from obvious evolutionary process.

The focus of international negotiations on climate change is on the classification and implementation of responsibilities to mitigate it, details that define the respective duties of developed and developing countries. So far, developed countries have not entirely fulfilled their commitments under the UNFCCC. They are inactive in setting and realizing their emission reduction targets, and in providing aid to developing countries in technological development or transfer, capital and capability building. Instead, they are keen to put pressure on developing countries such as China and India regarding emission reduction targets. This foot-dragging and deflection seriously slows progress on cooperation.

History tells us this won’t end anytime soon. Disputes will not disappear, but communications and talks to iron out differences will stay the course. This outstanding issue will continue to dominate political and economic agendas at the international and domestic levels, but the urgency that surrounds it will fluctuate to some extent.

Taking the long view, an international climate response mechanism will be intimately linked with trade, investment and technology, if it is to result in the common global good. This will be a long evolutionary course, not a quick fix. The Copenhagen process will conclude with compromises from various parties, and its targets to protect our climate will also be compromised, at best showing a zigzag advancement. In fact, there is already a feeling: fiercer arguments and heavier pressure will erupt in 2015 at the international negotiations on post-2020 emission reduction targets.