An Overcautious Newcomer

    In 1971, I was 32. Following the restoration of China's legitimate seat in the United Nations by the UN General Assembly, I was selected for a position in the first Chinese delegation to the United Nations. I personally experienced the initial excitement, curiosity and overcautiousness that flavored China's return to the international community.

    In 1996, prior to the opening of the 52nd Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, I became Chinese ambassador to the UN, headquartered in Geneva. Some Western countries submitted – for the sixth time – a human rights motion directed against China, and the session turned into a difficult battle for us. It was also the most trying period in my diplomatic career.

    In all, I had 13 years of working experience in the United Nations, 10 years in New York and three years in Geneva. When I first worked there in 1971, China was still isolated. After I received a notice I'd be working as an expatriate, I looked around for information on the United Nations, and finally found in a French dictionary a matchbox-sized photo of the UN headquarters in New York. "Oh, so this is the UN," I thought.

    There was no direct flight from Beijing to New York at the time. We flew from Beijing to Shanghai, changed to a French airliner to get to Paris, and then flew from Paris to New York. All the delegates wore Mao suits, as there was no other available choice of formal uniform. At that time, expatriates had designated tailors; our suits were made by Beijing's "Hongdu" (Red Capital) garment shop. Later, in Paris, I met some Chinese technicians on an economic aid mission to Africa who were clad in Western suits. Apparently, they did not know how to wear them properly: the collars of their shirts were not buttoned up, and everyone wore the same tie with a coat of dust on top.

    About to land in New York's Kennedy Airport, the crew told us more than 500 reporters were waiting for us. That day, the head of the Chinese delegation Qiao Guanhua left as soon as he finished reading his speech at the airport. None of us replied to the reporters' questions. On our arrival, the United Nations also immediately extended its greetings. The UN General Assembly convened to mark this special occasion and many countries clamored to welcome our delegation. Given the atmosphere stirred up by impassioned speeches, the United States could no longer ignore us. George HW Bush was the U.S. representative to the United Nations at that time. He spoke frankly before the meeting was over, "We opposed your coming here, but, you've come in any case. Welcome."

    Delegations from various countries and the locals were curious about us as well. Many journalists hung around our hotel, pestering the clerks with questions about such things as what we had for lunch that day. We were like aliens to them, and everything about us made news. All of us soon got into our roles and became familiar with the operation of the United Nations, earning the admiration of fellow delegations. It wasn't long before the UN Security Council met to discuss the Indo-Pakistan issue, and raised voices asserted vehement opinions. China's policy on the issue was clear: one, it would safeguard its own interests; two, it would stand by developing countries and support decolonization; and three, it would oppose the revisionism of the Soviet Union. The Chinese delegation was quite outspoken on these matters, and the general reactions of other member countries were positive.

    Our understanding of the United Nations went through several stages, which were closely tied to our own evolving domestic situation. The first stage was from 1971 to the end of the "cultural revolution" in 1976, when we just tried to get by. Influenced by Leftist policies at home during this five-year period, the delegation concentrated on supporting developing countries and opposing the two "Superpowers." Other issues were avoided in the name of being "transcendent." There were many opportunities to take a stand but we passed on them, considering the matters none of our business. It was after China joined the United Nations that the organization created a fourth voting option – "non-participation" – whereas previously there was vote, veto and abstention. We also disagreed with the UN's peacekeeping role around the world. Now of course China is involved in UN peacekeeping missions all over the globe, and this change of attitude is momentous.

1971: Qiao Guanhua (sencond right), head of the Chinese delegation to the United Nations, greets British ambassador. Wu Jianmin is first from left.

    From 1978 to 1992, following the implementation of the reform and opening-up policy, China became increasingly more active in international affairs. Previously, we were disinterested in the disarmament cause, but became gradually involved later on. The same was true of human rights issues, for we initially felt the human rights movement was a creature of the Western value system. Now China is a member of the UN Human Rights Council, which has been a transforming experience.

    The third stage, from 1992 to present, has witnessed significant adjustments to our foreign policy. China has gone through a dramatic change – active in peacekeeping and disarmament talks, pushing for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and moving forward on human rights issues.

    Of course, "quarrels" are inevitable. The human rights issue is an obvious example. The United States started in 1989 to submit human rights motions against China, and did so every year, despite being defeated each time. In 1996 I arrived in Geneva as China's ambassador to the UN, and asked the U.S. representative if they would put together an anti-China motion again that year; the answer was "yes." As far as I knew, many countries were in fact resentful of Western countries using the human rights issue to exert pressure on developing countries. So we consulted with many consenting members on the issue – mainly developing countries such as India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Algeria – and reached an understanding with them. On the second day of the human rights session when we were discussing the agenda, more than 10 ambassadors from developing countries used the time to speak, one after another, against this antagonism and in support of dialogue, arguing that the strongly antagonistic atmosphere of the Commission's meetings were not at all conducive to the advancement of human rights.

    Delegates from developed countries were simply overwhelmed, looking dumbfounded at one another, as if saying: What's this? A rebellion? They were caught unprepared, and the U.S. motion was finally vetoed by a difference of seven votes. The struggle was also heated in the 1997 session, when we also won by a difference of 10 votes. On the last day of that human rights commission meeting, U.S. delegation leader Nancy Robin made an appointment with me. The first sentence out of her mouth was, "Ambassador Wu, I've been watching you, and I've seen that you've made good use of every minute of the session." Having been in contact with Americans for many years, I knew she meant it as a compliment. Then she conceded that indeed such antagonism would lead nowhere. I reminded her that the U.S. had started it and China would of course welcome the U.S. dropping it. She said she would lobby for dialogue after she went back. In 1998, the United States stopped its practice of proposing anti-China motions.