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2014-October-31

APEC China 2014: A New Opportunity for Sino-U.S. Relations

 Behind Strained Ties

The Sino-U.S. relationship has remained strained since November 2013, and the reasons are multiple. First and foremost, the Obama administration, vexed by a number of simmering international security issues, is wary about appearing soft in its China policy. It has, therefore, hewed to the rebalancing strategy, first revealed in 2011, and pins China as its top target in the transformation of its global strategies. Recalibration of the U.S. policies for the Asia-Pacific region is the top irritant in its relationship with China.

The rebalancing strategy of the Obama administration was meant to readjust the U.S. global strategic deployment and priorities in light of the growing strength of China, making countering China a more pressing issue in U.S. policies towards Asia. The purpose is to steer its global strategies away from the mess of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to ensure the U.S. can effectively and promptly guard against and contain China. The core of the rebalancing strategy is not only to consolidate the U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific and expand defense cooperation and strategic partnerships, but also to support the countries in the region that contend with China over territorial or security issues. The U.S. exploits the complex impact of a rising China on regional security, and plays on the mentality of smaller countries in the Asia-Pacific of seeking aegis from bigger brothers, forcefully accelerating the intensity of its diplomatic and military endeavors to suppress China. Its goal is to build military capacity to deter China, and meanwhile win support from regional countries, so undermining China’s diplomatic and political clout. All in all, the rebalancing strategy is designed to entrench the U.S. as the world’s sole superpower.

There are three notable differences between the U.S.’ current China policy and that prior to 2011. The first concerns psychology. The U.S. is afraid that China will see it as in decline and seize on this opportunity to conduct strategic expansion. The U.S., therefore, interprets China’s normal, justified actions to defend its legitimate rights as attempts to seek strategic expansion in the face of receding U.S. strength. In the eyes of certain American politicians, China’s maritime moves to defend its sovereign rights are the country’s endeavors to change the status quo.

The second is about mentality. The U.S. thinks that China is becoming more and more aggressive and defiant of it, and that it has to press China into accepting its leading position in the Asia-Pacific by strutting its will, resolve and strength, preventing the prospect of China’s strategic influence from escalating to a level that threatens U.S. economic, political and strategic interests in the region. As a result, the pitch of discussions of China policy within the U.S. has shifted to greater vigilance and less friendliness.

The third lies in the increasing sensitivity of both sides. A rising China has indeed inflicted changes to a certain degree on the balance of strength between it and the U.S., about which both countries seem over-sensitive. They need to readjust their bilateral ties to the new power balance and carefully gauge either party’s capabilities, intentions and policy goals.

For instance, the U.S.’ close-range reconnaissance on China in the sea and air typically reflects its angst over the increasing level of modernization of China’s military force. In the past years the U.S. has carried out on average more than 500 close-range reconnaissance missions to China every year, blatantly spying on China’s military secrets and so signifying growing hostility towards China. The Chinese military, of course, feels strong repulsion toward such deeds of stark disrespect of Chinese dignity, and is justified in blocking U.S. surveillance off China’s coast. These spying efforts by the U.S. and mid-air interception by China predictably add to the stress in bilateral ties, and increase the odds of military clashes. 

 

APEC Summit, Another Occasion for Talks

Whatever discord exists between China and the U.S., their relationship remains the most important for global politics in the 21st century, and is understandably complex. Historical experience has testified that the two governments must keep in contact, and their leaders must sustain frank, practical and constructive dialogues before they can manage and control their disparities and foster a stable situation. The annual APEC summit is a key mechanism for direct dialogues between the heads of state of the two countries. The first APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in 1993, attended by Chinese President Jiang Zemin and U.S. President Bill Clinton, was critical for the two countries in moving out of a political deadlock after 1989. But the nations’ top leaders missed the chance of dialogue at the 21st Economic Leaders’ Meeting of APEC in Indonesia last year, when the U.S. President was forced to stay at home amid the government shutdown due to federal budget deficit.

This year’s Beijing Summit will bring together President Xi Jinping and President Barack Obama, who are expected to discuss the thorny issue of Sino-Japanese ties, among others. We sincerely hope that dialogues between the leaders of the two major countries will continue. As Chinese President Xi Jinping has pointed out, “the Pacific Ocean is big enough to accommodate both China and the United States.”

 

ZHU FENG is executive director of the Collaborative Innovation Center for South China Sea Studies, based at Nanjing University, and associate dean of the Institute of International & Strategic Studies, Peking University.

 

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