Going Global: an Uphill Battle
Chinese companies face a myriad of restrictions in offshore markets despite abundant access to financing
By JOHN ROSS
CHINESE companies “going global” are increasingly welcomed in foreign markets. Even U.S. regulators, who once balked at the prospect of Chinese investment on American shores, now routinely approve significant acquisitions by Chinese companies. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), for instance, was the first Chinese firm to take over a U.S. bank when it purchased the Bank of East Asia in May last year.
Takeovers of North American companies by Chinese firms are becoming increasingly common. In January, Chinese automotive components manufacturer Wanxiang purchased U.S. battery maker A123. In neighboring Canada, approval was recently granted for the China National Offshore Oil Corporation to take over Calgary-based energy giant Nexen.
Sentiment, however, is by no means exclusively pro-Chinese when it comes to overseas investments. We regularly see both sides of the debate in the media and publishing industries. Sometimes pieces that take a pessimistic view of Chinese companies’ global operations border on fear-mongering, such as when The Economist ran “Who’s Afraid of Huawei?” for its cover story last August. Books regularly hit the shelves with titles such as Is China Buying the World?.
Some knowledgeable commentators do take Chinese companies’ “side” in the issue. Mthuli Ncube, chief economist of the African Development Bank, recently wrote that China’s investment in African nations was potentially “the biggest opportunity in their history.”
The reason for all the interest is evident. China is the world’s second largest economy and likely to become the largest within a decade. It is the world’s largest goods exporter and second largest importer. But Chinese companies are only just starting to pursue major outward foreign direct investment (FDI).
As recently as 2003 China’s annual outward FDI was a mere US $2.9 billion, 0.5 percent of the world total. By 2011, the latest year for which full global data is available, China’s outward FDI was US $65.1 billion. The figure for the first 11 months of 2012 was US $62.5 billion, a 25 percent rise over the same period in 2011. China’s outward FDI in 2011 was almost 2,300 percent of its level in 2003, orders of magnitude above the EU’s 150 percent, the U.S.’s 300 percent and Japan’s 400 percent. Little wonder China’s FDI attracts attention!
But it is necessary to keep a strict sense of proportion. China’s outward FDI in 2011 was only 4.3 percent of the global total, compared to 7.5 percent for Japan, 26 percent for the U.S. and 27.6 percent for the EU. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s target of US $150 billion in 2015 would still be under half the US $397 billion the U.S. invested abroad in 2011, and only slightly over a third of the EU’s US $420 billion. While in some industries China has major outward FDI, in many others constraints prevent China’s outward FDI assuming large dimensions.
The strength behind China’s outward FDI is its huge financial resources. China’s annual finance available for investment – its savings – is US $3.6 trillion; the U.S. gets buy on a comparatively meager $1.8 trillion. China’s US $3.3 trillion foreign exchange reserves are the world’s largest.
It takes time to translate this financial strength into equivalent company scale. China’s companies, except in a few industries, are not yet as large as international competitors and FDI usually requires greater resources than operating in a company’s own country.
To show the position of China’s companies among their international competition, and therefore their realistic potential to “go global,” Table 1 gives the percentage of revenue of the major economies in the world’s largest 2,000 publicly listed companies. These companies’ turnover is equivalent to half of world GDP – a much larger sample than the oft-quoted Fortune 500.
China has advanced strongly from a low base – rising from a one percent share in 2004 to seven percent in 2012. In single country comparisons China comes in third behind the U.S. and Japan, although this overstates China’s position since the EU is second behind the U.S. if it is treated as a single entity. China’s large company revenues are slightly over half Japan’s and a quarter of those of the EU and U.S.
China’s outward FDI flow mirrors the position of China’s large companies, though it is considerably weaker against the U.S. and EU. In 2011 China’s outward FDI was slightly over half Japan’s but only one sixth of the U.S. or EU.
Analyzing individual global industries indicates the unevenness of China’s position and attests to certain sectors’ having “gone global” earlier than others.
In 15 out of 27 major global industry groups China’s share is less than three percent. This includes not only high-tech sectors such as semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and aerospace, but also basic industries such as personal care products, retailers, and media. The 12 global industry groups in which China holds significant market shares are shown in Table 2.
China is strong in construction, which includes not only buildings but also railways and infrastructure, with the second largest share after the EU’s 40 percent. For example China’s dam constructer Sinohydro has US $21 billion of projects in 55 countries, and receives a quarter of its revenue from overseas operations.
Chinese companies are also strong in primary materials – oil and gas, mining, and basic metals such as steel. In basic materials and mining China holds second position after the EU, which commands a 25 percent share. In oil and gas China is third after the EU and U.S., both of which have 27 percent – although these figures are inflated as some of the world’s most important oil companies, such as the Saudi Arabian Oil Company and the National Iranian Oil Company, are state owned and unlisted on stock exchanges. China’s oil and gas companies have real international strength in FDI with US $92 billion of foreign acquisitions since 2009, including a record US $35 billion in 2012. By 2015 Chinese companies’ overseas production will be equivalent to a major oil producer such as Kuwait.
Reflecting China’s unequalled financial power, its banks are in a strong position. First to globalize were China’s official development banks. In 2005-2011 China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank) provided over US $75 billion in loan commitments to Latin America. In 2010 their US $37 billion in commitments was more than what’s from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the United States Export-Import bank combined. In Africa Exim Bank has lent more than the World Bank every year since 2005.
The globalization of China’s commercial banks is proceeding rapidly. By the beginning of 2013, ICBC, the world’s largest bank by market capitalization, operated in 39 countries with overseas assets of US $170 billion – a 30 percent increase on 2011.
Nevertheless, in many global industries, including manufacturing, Chinese companies are smaller than their competitors. Even in China’s strongest manufacturing sector – capital goods – its leading construction equipment makers Sany and Zoomlion only derive 10 percent of their revenue from overseas sales, compared to 60-70 percent for U.S. competitor Caterpillar. In technology Lenovo is the world’s second largest PC maker but production is primarily in China. Haier, the world’s number one domestic goods producer that manufactures in many countries, is an exception to the rule. In most non-financial services China is weak – the scale of its telephone operators reflecting the size of its domestic market, not international operations.
But the dynamic is clear. Table 2 shows that in 2012 China had 12 industries with more than three percent world market share. In 2004 it only had one! As Chinese companies strengthen China’s huge financial resources will allow them to globalize across a wider range of industries. In sectors such as banking, construction and basic materials China’s “going global” is already well underway. It is simply a matter of time before China’s across-the-board overseas FDI proportionally matches the size of its economy.
(Wang Juan contributed to research in this article.)
