Does the Crimea Issue Presage Cold War II?
Strategic Opportunity for China?
There are worries in the U.S. and Europe that the Crimea issue will enhance Sino-Russian strategic cooperation, because sanctions will push Russia towards further cooperation with China. However, it would be difficult for yet another split to occur in U.S.-Russia European geopolitics. Nor is there sufficient tension in American-Russian relations to induce the U.S. to change its “rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific” strategy. The core of its global defense and security posture is still in the Asia-Pacific region.
China opposes international intervention on issues concerning Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan. With regards to Crimea, the Chinese government will consequently neither support nor get too close to Russia in matters of strategic cooperation aimed at confronting the West. Chinese diplomacy emphasizes that responses to major international issues should be in accordance with actual conditions, justifiable, favorable, and with a sense of proportion. China has always adhered to the principle of non-intervention. Strategic cooperation with Russia will not make it relinquish this principle. China nevertheless understands Russia’s historical link with and special interests in Ukraine and Crimea, hence that the actions it has taken in Crimea “have some basis.” China’s response, therefore, is both moderate and appropriate. Giving support to Russia’s military intervention would violate China’s principle of non-intervention. It would also fuel other Asia countries’ misgivings about China.
The sanctions imposed on Russia might indeed make it more economically dependent on China. This, in turn, could intensify common interests between the two countries as regards economy, energy and geopolitics. It does not mean, however, that China and Russia will resolve to deal jointly with Western countries through a “Sino-Russian strategic alliance.” Maintaining good cooperation and a mutually beneficial relationship with the West rather constitutes the main practical interests of both China and Russia.
The lull in Crimea for the moment does not signify an end to the Ukraine crisis. Eastern Ukraine’s evolution and the trend of Russia’s policy towards the region overshadow the seriousness of the Crimea issue. If in the future Russia intervenes further in eastern Ukraine, and the Ukraine government takes the stance of armed resistance, a new turn in the Ukraine crisis is likely. Should there be a head-on confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, intervention by the U.S. and Europe cannot be ruled out. But unless a Crimea scenario unfolds in eastern Ukraine whereby pro-Russia forces take control of the region and announce a referendum on independence, Russia is unlikely to militarily intervene. Helping the new Ukrainian government handle the core matters of economy, politics and diplomacy, and keeping control of the situation in Ukraine as a whole is the present focus of the U.S. and Europe. But as Russia does not recognize the legitimacy of Kiev transitional authority, the Ukraine crisis will go on.
ZHU FENG is executive director of the Collaborative Innovation Center for South China Sea Studies, based at Nanjing University, and associate dean of the Institute of International & Strategic Studies, Peking University.