Does the Crimea Issue Presage Cold War II?

The confrontation between the U.S. and Russia over Crimea and Ukraine is the most significant geopolitical event since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Twenty-three years after the end of the Cold War, bumpy U.S.-Russia and Europe-Russia relations seem once again to portend a collision course. But the Crimea crisis is unlikely to culminate in a political divide to match that of 23 years ago.

Annoyance over Western Alignment

The Ukraine crisis is attributable to the U.S. and NATO’s geopolitical expansion to Eastern Europe, and Russia’s strategic adjustment in the post-Cold War years. The U.S. is bent on capitalizing on Russia’s waning clout since the fall of the Soviet Union, and subsequent dramatic changes in Eastern Europe. The U.S. has consequently buttressed restraints on Russia and its geopolitical influence throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Its intentions are apparent in support for NATO’s eastward expansion, backing of the Color Revolution and throwing its weight behind Ukraine’s moves to align with the EU.

Russia’s dispatch of troops to Crimea and refusal to be intimidated by the West’s threatened sanctions came as no surprise. Ukraine is, and has long been, of high geopolitical significance to Russia. Military intervention was a likely response to the U.S. and Europe’s incitement and support of protests in Kiev that overthrew pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovych. The U.S. and Europe assumed that exerting diplomatic and political pressure on Russia would avert any military action. But they underestimated Moscow’s resolve to defend its geopolitical influence in Ukraine.

No matter how obdurate the Putin government might be on that score, it must nevertheless face the reality that the Cold War is over. The Soviet Union is no more, and Russia does not have sufficient military, economic and political power to intervene in or command Eastern European countries. Nor would any military campaign such as that against Hungary in 1956, against Czechoslovakia in 1968 and against Afghanistan in 1979 be in its strategic interest.

Putin has been both tactful and prudent in dealing with the Ukraine crisis. With the support of the local Russian-speaking majority, he sent troops that swiftly occupied the airport, port and military bases in eastern Ukraine, so forestalling any attempt by Kiev at military suppression. Having established its military presence in the area, Russia then encouraged local pro-Russia forces to stage movements calling for Crimea to break away from Ukraine. With the State Duma and Russian people behind him, Putin stood firm against the West.

By becoming directly involved with Crimea on the ground, Putin set out to retain Russia’s control over coastal military bases and facilities, and so defend its military capability in the Black Sea. When the March 16 referendum results were announced, he deftly completed the necessary legal procedure whereby Crimea will rejoin Russia. Putin thus diffused mounting opposition from the U.S. and EU as well as criticism from the international community. Russia refuses to recognize the interim government in Kiev. It meanwhile continues to exert influence over Donetsk and other cities in eastern Ukraine and observe the political trend in the region. Should eastern Ukraine eventually follow Crimea’s example and hold a referendum on whether or not to break away from Ukraine, Russia will pounce on this historic opportunity. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov refused to acknowledge his counterpart in the Ukraine interim government in a Paris meeting on March 5, so implying that there will be no turnaround in Russia’s stance on the Ukraine issue. But there is little likelihood Russia will resort to further military intervention.

Not a Vital Interest

The U.S. and Europe will not accept a divided Ukraine, or at least not recognize the political legitimacy of the accession of Crimea into Russia. One reason why is that it sets a precedent for Russia’s future forceful intervention or splintering of former Soviet Union republics and Eastern European countries. Russia might in future feel empowered to intervene or conduct geopolitical expansion in its western border regions. This would threaten EU control of the European situation and stability in Europe as a whole. The U.S. and EU countries fear Putin’s aspirations to unify and integrate former Soviet Union republics and establish a Russia-led “Eurasian Union.” This could lead to restoration of Russia’s leading role in the market economy and diplomatic coordination with surrounding countries. Putin once said that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century. If the U.S. and Europe cannot make Russia pay what they deem due penalty for the Crimea issue, Putin, with his strong “Soviet Union complex,” might take this as carte blanche to carry out forceful interventions throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States.

It will, moreover, be difficult for the Obama administration to explain Crimea’s joining Russia in the domestic political arena. The Republicans will be even more critical of Obama’s “weak” foreign policy. Standing by as Russia swallows Crimea might also signify to the American people that President Obama’s stated resolve to bring democracy to Ukraine is mere lip service. It will also deal a heavy blow to the Color Revolution in North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, which the U.S has supported since 2007.

The U.S. and Europe have taken certain measures against Russia that include exerting diplomatic pressure and imposing economic sanctions and political boycotts. Japan and certain Western countries have suspended their 16-year collaboration with Russia in the G8 group due to the Crimea issue. But none of these measures will induce Putin to compromise. Russia is unlikely to desist from intervening in Ukraine unless the U.S. and Europe adopt confrontational military measures. The problem is that neither the U.S. nor the European countries concerned have either the will or any concrete plan for military involvement or intervention in Crimea. As in the Russo-Georgian War of August 2008, therefore, the U.S. must gradually concede to Russia’s special interests on its western borders.

The crisis in Ukraine will not trigger “Cold War II” between the U.S. and Russia. American leaders and media may appear to regard it as the most serious upheaval in the European security environment since the Cold War. They also suspect Russia’s ambitions towards eastern Ukraine and other former Soviet republics. But this amounts to nothing more than a general emotional dissatisfaction with Russia’s military intervention in Crimea. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Europe’s geopolitics has crucially advanced Western countries’ progression. The accession of Crimea to Russia is the first reversal of that process. Twenty-three years later, although Russia lacks the power that the Soviet Union once wielded, it is still a formidable force in the European political arena that neither the U.S. nor any European country can withstand; Russia can still challenge their geopolitical interests. Crimea joining Russia does not in itself equal in importance the impact on and challenge it implies to the West.

The fact of the matter is that the U.S. does not have any strategic interests in Ukraine or Crimea. It consequently does not think it economically or militarily viable either to intervene or once more strategically confront Russia. Although the U.S. and Europe strongly condemn Russia in principle, their responses as a whole have been restrained and moderate. The door to dialogue is still open. Sanctions are also no more than a formality, and not substantive. The Obama administration has on one occasion conceded that Russia has special interests in Crimea and Ukraine.